This paper investigates the optimal design of a patent challenge mechanism through the re-allocation of patent rights, in which a successful challenger is rewarded with partial patent rights previously granted to the patentee. Two incentive problems shape the optimal mechanism: how to provide a potential challenger with adequate incentives to look for the defeating prior art, and whether and how to prevent collusion once the prior art has been found. Transferring patent rights to a successful challenger encourages search and deters collusion; it also reduces costly opportunistic patenting and therefore improves patent quality. However, from an ex post point of view, oversearch ensues when collusion is severe or when the challenger is the only user of the technology. The optimal policy, then, calls for a careful balance between these costs and benefits. The paper also shows that when multiple players engage in sequential searches, the optimal policy may be to deter collusion in the later stage but accommodate collusion between the patent-holder and the fact-finder after the early stage of search. Partial collusion-deterrence preserves the subsequent searcher's incentives and reduces the cost to fight collusion.
Introduction
To encourage innovation, our society established the patent system to reward inventors with limited monopoly rights for their inventions. In doing so, society endures shortterm losses associated with monopoly in exchange for long-run gains from technological progress (Nordhaus, 1969) . However, if a patented technology turns out to be 'old,'
i.e., already in the public domain, losses come without compensating benefits. For the patent system to serve social interests, it is essential to maintain a good quality of issued patents, in terms of patentability requirements in the patent law. 1 In the United States and other major economies, this task primarily falls on the patent office, though the private sector also plays an important role.
Among various advantages, private sector players may have better information than public agencies. For instance, private technology users may have a comparative advantage in assessing the value of an invention, and therefore in identifying those patent applications worthy of detailed examination. Experts from lab researchers to amateur garage inventors may be more familiar with the state of the art and know better where to 'dig' in the public domain to find out the prior art. This information forms the basis for determining whether an invention represents enough technological advancement, relative to current knowledge, to justify patent protection. To better exploit this reservoir of knowledge, we need a properly designed patent challenge procedure that is designed to allow a third party to submit useful information and challenge an issued patent's validity, This paper examines a special challenge mechanism, that is, the re-allocation of patent rights upon the disclosure of patent-defeating prior art, and asks: After a challenger presents the patent-defeating information, how much reward should be given to the challenger in the form of (partial) patent rights previously granted to the patentholder, to what extent can society withdraw issued patent rights, and should the patentholder be left with some residual rights?
This study of optimal IPRs allocation builds on the existence of two incentive problems: The collusion associated with patent challenges and incentives to look for the prior art. When the prior art is discovered, most current post-grant challenge procedures mandate the invalidation of all patent rights. But since a patent grants monopoly access to an invention, it generates the highest benefit one can extract from technol-ogy users. This benefit gives the challenger a strong incentive to strike a deal with the patent-holder rather than invalidate the patent and dissipate monopoly rent. Is a policy which invalidates all patent rights immune to collusion? 2 Regarding incentives to search for information, the mere fact that the prior art is not readily available to patent examiners suggests a non-negligible search cost, which raises a concern about whether private search incentives align with social interests.
Both concerns are crucial in shaping the optimal mechanism. When a challenger is the sole technology user (section 3), collusion problem is moot; but it turns out that private incentives lead to over-search. The over-search problem may be addressed by only partially invalidating a patent after a successful challenge and leaving some residual rights to the original patent-holder.
We then examine situations where both collusion and search problems exist. In section 4, we consider a case where the optimal mechanism requires full collusion deterrence. In a collusion-proof mechanism, collusion deterrence can be addressed by rewarding the challenger with enough gain to induce prior art submission, while fully depriving the original patent-holder of her patent rights. However, the discrepancy between social and private incentives to search may distort this rule in two directions: after a successful challenge, either a larger reward should be distributed to the challenger, or the patent-holder should be treated more leniently.
Suppose, for example, that the challenger is not a technology user, 3 and consider two polar cases. When collusion is moderate, only minor patent rights need to be transferred to the challenger in order to induce prior art submission. In this case under-search ensues, since all technology users benefit greatly from the revocation of monopoly rights, and so a larger reward may be warranted in order to boost search incentives. On the other hand, under perfect collusion, patent rights can not be narrowed after a challenge; otherwise the fact-finder will collude with the patent-holder and remain silent. The deadweight loss is unchanged; private search causes at most a redistribution of monopoly rent and brings no social benefit. To deter this rent-seeking 2 Law scholars have expressed the same worry. See Thomas (2001) , Hovenkamp et al. (2003) , and Miller (2004) . Although by nature evidence of collusion is difficult to obtain, in the past decade the Federal Trade Commission has consistently challenged 'reverse payment' in the pharmaceutical industry on the ground that it serves an anticompetitive purpose where a brand-name drug maker colludes and persuades a generic drug maker to stay off the market by virtue of the latter's ability to strike down or inventaround the patent covering the targeted brand-name drug. See the statement of Commissioner, J. Leibowitz, prepared before the Special Committee on Aging of the U.S. Senate on July 20, 2006 (available online at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/07/P052103BarrierstoGenericEntryTestimonySenate07202006.pdf) 3 This is not the case in the later discussion, but the main message remains the same.
activity, the optimal policy is to leave all patent rights in the hands of the original owner, and no challenge should take place (section 4.1).
We should caution that this analysis considers only the ex post stage, i.e., after R&D is completed and the patent has been issued. Patent challenges may be beneficial from the ex ante point of view. For example, they may encourage innovation or deter opportunistic patenting (section 4.2). A sound policy, then, calls for a careful balance between ex post rent-seeking costs and ex ante benefits of higher patent quality.
Lastly, section 5 provides a case of optimal collusion accommodation. Suppose two challengers engage in sequential searches. In this case, the second challenger's search decision depends on whether the patent has been challenged, and on collusion policy. If collusion between the patent-holder and the first challenger is fully deterred, the lack of a challenge is attributed to the first challenger's search failure. For the second challenger, this implies a lower probability of discovering information and thus reduces his search efforts. But if collusion is tolerated, the absence of a challenge doesn't convey such a bad news. The second challenger's search incentives increase with the degree of collusion in the previous round. On the other hand, under collusive bargaining, the patent-holder and the first challenger take into account the subsequent challenger's search activity: if the second challenger also finds the prior art, either this information will be submitted to the patent office, or he will share collusive gains with the others. Incentives to collude are decreasing in the second challenger's search.
Deterring collusion after the early discovery of information may not be optimal due to this concern, namely, early deterrence of collusion between the patent-holder and the first challenger thwarts subsequent search and this makes it more costly to implement such a policy.
The paper is organized as follows: After a short discussion of the literature and recent debate about the patent quality, we introduce our model in section 2. We then derive the optimal challenge mechanism in different environments, including the single-user case (sections 3), the multiple-user collusion-proof mechanism (section 4), and sequential search (section 5); and section 6 discusses some implementation issues.
All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
Related literature and reform proposals: The United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) has been repeatedly criticized for issuing low quality patents, 4 and is the frequent subject of discussions about reform. However, in recognizing the importance of the private sector, Lemley (2001) suggests that the patent office should remain "rationally ignorant" and tolerate the issuance of some bad patents.
His reasoning is that not all patents are equally important and private players are more capable than the patent office of identifying those patents that cover valuable technologies and warrant detailed scrutiny.
Given dubious quality control at the USPTO, there tend to be relatively few patent re-examination requests-a worrisome national trend. 5 This failure has been largely attributed to challenger-unfriendly features of the U.S. system, Compared with its European counterpart, patent opposition, the U.S. system significantly restricts issues that can be raised in a challenge, limits the extent to which a challenger can participate in the procedure, and limits appeals. 6 Accordingly, a number of reform proposals suggest improving the U.S. challenge system by introducing an alternative timing,
i.e. pre-grant challenges; by broadening the grounds to initiate a challenge; and by streamlining current procedures to ensure cost efficiency and timeliness, to name a few. 7 And some commentators advocate a shift toward the European opposition process. 8
4 Amusing examples include: "Method of bra size determination by direct measurement of the breast," U.S. patent 5,965,809; "Method of executing a tennis stroke," U.S. patent 5,993,336; "Method of swinging on a swing," U.S. patent 6,368,227. The swing patent is granted on April 2002 to a five-year-old son of a patent lawyer. A less amusing example is Amazon's "one-click" patent, U.S. patent 5,960,411, which helped Amazon win a preliminary injunction against its major competitor, Barnes & Noble, just before the 1999's Christmas season. Statistical studies present similar concerns. For example, Quillen and Webster (2001) shows that, after taking into account the continuation application and continuation-in-part applications, the USPTO's allowance rate (the number of applications allowed divided by the number filed) in the mid-1990s is 95%, compared to 68% and 65% for the European and Japanese patent offices, respectively.
5 Graham et al. (2003) reports that only 0.3% of patents granted between 1991-8 are reexamined and half of the requests are brought by holders of the patent. 6 In the U.S., a reexamination request can only be based on the ground of prior art citation, i.e. whether the patent office has missed an important prior art in issuing the patent. In Europe, an opposition can be filed on issues as diverse as the subject matter, disclosure requirement, etc. For challenger participation, an inter partes reexamination was introduced by the 1999 legislature: The American Inventors Protection Act. Before that, U.S. procedure was solely ex partes; a challenger's role was confined to an initial statement of why a patent should not be granted, together with supporting evidence, while the patent-holder could fully communicate with the patent office. The higher level of participation permitted in inter partes reexamination, however, entails limited means of appeal: issues that are raised, or could have been raised during reexamination cannot be readdressed in later litigation involving the same challenger. By contrast, there is no such restriction in the European opposition, and both the challenger and the agency are allowed more active roles. The Opposition Division of the European Patent Office can search for new prior art and pursue cases on its own, even if private parties want to settle and withdraw the case. . These papers provide a welfare estimation of the benefit the U.S. could realize by adopting the European system. Alternatively, some legal scholars favor a bounty system. 9 In fact, bounties have already been initiated by private efforts. Around 2001-2002, BountyQuest was launched online to serve as a platform to post and respond to bounties for patent-defeating information. 10 Given widespread complaints about poor patent quality, this company was expected to be a great success. After a few years, though, this expectation doesn't seem to have been met and no competing firm has appeared.
Most of the preceding proposals take as granted that a patent is fully invalidated after a successful challenge. By contrast, the Hatch-Waxman Act prescribes a very different regime for the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. Under this act, a successful challenger is rewarded with a 180-day monopoly right to market a generic version of the drug covered by an invalidated patent. Thus, the act provides a successful challenger with a shorter but still positive period of monopoly. 11 This paper considers the Hatch-Waxman type mechanism and examines factors driving its optimal design. 12 
Model
There are four classes of players in the model. The authority in charge of patent institutions P , namely, Congress or courts, designs challenge policy. An inventor A decides whether to undertake a R&D project; if so, she applies for and is granted a patent, 13 and then licenses her patent. Technology users B i , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }, N ≥ 1, decide whether to buy the license. And the information searcher(s) decides whether to search for prior art, and once found the information, whether to submit it to P or to collude with A. Information searchers can be a technology user B j (section 3 and 4) or non-users H · (section 5). Assume that all private parties are protected by limited liability. 14 9 Thomas (2001) suggests an examination-stage bounty paid by the patent applicant to the whistleblower. Miller (2003) favors a bounty at the litigation stage, and suggests to reward the challenger with the patentee's past profits, which, as we shall see, has a flavor similar to our approach.We provide a preliminary analysis of the bounty system in Appendix C. 10 Official website: http://bountyquest.master.com (last visit on November 23, 2005) . Somewhat amusingly, the founder of BountyQuest applied for a patent on the business model of the company. 11 To be more precise, the 180-day exclusivity period provides only quasi-monopoly rights. A controversial practice called 'authorized generics' allows brand drug makers to license to other generic firms and compete with the first challenger in the generic market.
12 Choi (2005) contemplates the extension of Hatch-Waxman scheme to other industries, but doesn't provide a formal analysis. 13 Nothing would be changed if invalid patents were granted with probability less than one. 14 We discuss this assumption in Appendix C.
Technology:
The inventor A undertakes the R&D project with cost k ∈ {0, K}, K > 0. A positive R&D cost corresponds to a technology breakthrough. Relative to current stock of knowledge, a technology is a true invention if and only if it requires a positive cost, k = K. In contrast, the technology already exists in the public domain if k = 0. Only the innovator is aware of the true k; all other players share belief that P r(k = K) = α ∈ (0, 1). We call A an honest (opportunistic) inventor when k = K (k = 0, respectively).
The technology's value is independent of k, though. 15 User B i values the technology
Assume π > v l , so that the monopoly licensing fee is v h , and the ex post inefficiency or deadweight loss associated with monopoly is d. In aggregate, define V e ≡ N v e , Π ≡ N π, and D ≡ N d, with V e = Π + D.
Suppose that when there is no innovation (k = 0), a piece of information (patentdefeating prior art) can be found indicating that indeed the technology contains nothing new. 16 Assume the prior art exists if and only if k = 0, and it is a piece of hard information: There is no way to forge a non-existing information (when k = K); but when it exists and has been found, the fact-finder can withhold it and collude with the patent-holder (Tirole, 1986) . This implies that the patent office errs only by granting bogus patents (those that don't meet patentability criteria). 17 In sections 3 and 4, a user B j can spend a cost c(β) to find the prior art with probability β, given existence.
The cost function c(β) satisfies: c ′ > 0, c ′′ > 0, c ′ (0) = 0, c ′ (1) = ∞, and c(0) = 0.
Policy: We exclude public funds 18 and assume that P 's only policy tool is patent protection, or "patent power" θ ∈ [0, 1]. Given θ, the patent-holder charges a licensing fee v h and extracts a monopoly rent θπ from each user. User B i then gets (1 − θ)v i , and the expected deadweight loss is θd. A more powerful patent (θ higher) rewards the owner with higher profit, at the cost of greater (ex post) social loss.
To give P more policy flexibility, we allow for shared ownership of patent rights. If 15 This captures the idea that some bogus patents, although they do not satisfy the patentability criteria, cover valuable technologies. 16 From now on, 'prior art' means 'patent-defeating prior art': Upon discovery, everyone agrees that the patented technology doesn't meet the patentability requirement, k = 0.
17 In Appendix C.1 we will relax this assumption and introduce "type II" errors: P may err on the other side by invalidating a patent when k = K.
18 They are considered in Appendix C.2. The following examples illustrate two policy tools consistent with these assumptions. To induce innovation, the honest innovator's incentive constraint is θΠ ≥ K.
(1)
. Throughout the paper, the patent system aims at inducing innovation. When there is no challenge, the patent protection should be at least θ * .
Timing: Referring to Figure 1 , the timing of the game is as follows:
• At date 0, the patent authority designs the challenge policy;
• at date 1, A decides whether to undertake the R&D project given its cost k. The patent application and grant follow the expenditure of k;
• at date 2, the value of the technology v i is observed by user B i ;
• at date 3, when some party has found the prior art, the fact-finder decides whether to challenge the patent or to collude with the patent-holder (the collusion subgame is introduced in section 4); and
• at date 4, patent rights are allocated depending on whether there is a patent challenge, and licensing takes place.
When search capacity is assigned to user B j , we need to distinguish between two types of prior art search. We first show that any policy satisfyingθ > θ A leads to over-search, including the ex post efficient policy subject to condition (1): Θ * ≡ (θ * , 0), where the patent is entirely invalidated after prior art submission. We then propose two ways to discourage private search. 22 19 Uninformed search takes place when a patent covers a technology in its early stage of development. Users are uncertain of its true value, or may need to perform additional experiments to figure out how well the technology fits their needs. In contrast, informed search applies when a patented technology is relatively mature and any such experiments have already been conducted (though results remain the private information of individual users). 20 To motivate this case, consider any patented product. Patent-holder A lacks commercialization capacity and must license patent rights to an incumbent B. There may be potential entrants, but assume that a positive entry fee and fierce competition (e.g. Bertrand competition) drive post-entry profit to zero. Alternatively, there may be barriers to entry other than IPRs. When B acts as the sole manufacturer, the private information v may be a market demand or production cost parameter. 21 Otherwise B won't search; and A will submit any information in order to expand patent protection. 22 Appendix B considers a third way.
The discrepancy between private and social incentives to search is easiest to show with uninformed search. Suppose B chooses the search intensity β before learning v. Given a policy Θ = {θ, θ A }, withθ ≥ θ A , after finding and submitting prior art, B enjoys the whole production surplus over the narrowed patent right. The private benefit of a successful challenge is (θ −θ A )v e , and the privately optimal search intensitŷ β is determined bŷ β = arg max
On the other hand, society benefits from the reduction of deadweight loss associated with monopoly pricing. The socially optimal search intensity β * is determined by
Since v e > d, private incentives to search are greater than social incentives; this results in over-search,β > β * . The remainder of this section proposes two ways to address inadequate search incentives.
Patent policy: Taking search incentives into account, optimal policy is determined by the following program,
Social welfare W is composed of three elements: (i) with probability α, the patented technology is new (k = K), and cannot be invalidated. The inventor receives patent protectionθ, and deadweight loss isθd; (ii) with probability 1 − α, there is no new invention. If the challenger finds prior art (with probabilityβ), the patent-generated deadweight loss reduces to θ A d; otherwise, it remains atθd; and (iii) the information search cost c(β).
Solving the program, the optimalθ = θ * , and the optimal θ A may be greater than zero. For the former, absent a challenge, raising patent protection above θ * only creates more deadweight loss and induces higher search intensity, which already exceeds the socially optimal level. For the latter, raising θ A discourages private search: the optimal θ A > 0 if and only if the elasticity ofβ with respect toθ − θ A , when evaluated at Θ * , exceeds the ratio of the monopoly deadweight loss to the monopoly profit, i.e. whenβ is sufficiently sensitive to the policy adjustment. Proposition 1. When the challenger is the unique technology user, private incentives cause over-search. The optimalθ = θ * ; and it is optimal to set θ A > 0 if and only if
Signaling effect of private search: Alternatively, the signaling effect of a private challenge may discourage private search. If B engages in informed search, i.e., learns the true value v before searching (see Figure 1) , then different values v t may lead to different intensities β t , with t ∈ {h, l}. Suppose the search intensity is not observed by A. 23 Even so, as long as β h = β l , an opportunistic inventor acquires new information about v from the search outcome. 24
Consider an example of β l << β h ≃ 1. When there is no patent challenge, the opportunistic patent-holder infers search failure from low search intensity due to low value v l , i.e., the lack of a challenge signifies low value; she accordingly lowers the licensing fee to v l . The user with high value v h , then, has an incentive to weaken his search intensity in order to capitalize on this signaling effect and realize
β t is the privately optimal search level under the licensing fee v h . The following lemma
gives the shape of equilibria in this game (see the proof for the full characterization). 
23 This may not always be the case. Suppose, for instance, that B has no ability to search, but can post a bounty on BountyQuest's website (see section 1). B then controls the search intensity via the amount of bounty. By design this amount is public information.
24 There is no such learning for the honest inventor, since no prior art can be found whatever the intensity. • the opportunistic A holds beliefρ when observing no challenge.
Note that in E 2 , the user learns perfectly that A is opportunistic by observing the price offer v l . For simplicity, we assume away any search opportunity after this information is learned, and assume that the patent authority does not try to elicit the information from B. 25
In the pure strategy equilibrium E 1 , the licensing fee is fixed at v h . Prior art submission narrows patent protection fromθ to θ A , but social welfare increases only when v = v l . Put differently, given this pricing strategy and β, when the value of the technology increases from v l to v h , the private search benefit is raised from
zero. Following an increase in the technology value, the privately and socially optimal adjustments of search intensity go in opposite directions.
Equilibrium E 2 exists when condition (6) fails. This is the case whenβ h is large, i.e. a high-value user searches so intensively that, in case of search failure, the opportunistic inventor suspects that she most likely faces a low-value user and therefore reduces the licensing fee. The "no challenge" signal, then, confers benefit on the high-value user and thus justifies lower search intensity. 26 Since the two equilibria do not co-exist, we cannot compare their welfare effects without considering the underlying parameter values leading to each equilibrium. However, relative to the behavior described in E 1 , the behavior in equilibrium E 2 generates higher social welfare: the high-value user reduces his search intensity (although still exceeds the social optimal level), and the opportunistic inventor lowers the licensing fee with some probability. 25 Otherwise, we need to further consider the opportunistic inventor's incentive to mimic the honest type by offering v h , which is socially costly. 26 In this equilibrium, the high-value user still submits after discovery, for ( 
, where x is the probability that the opportunistic inventor offers v l when there is no challenge.
Proposition 2. Due to the signaling effect, the private behavior in equilibrium E 2 is more in line with social interests in terms of reduced search and the probability of a lower licensing fee.
Remark 1. (BountyQuest revisited)
Besides the usual free rider argument, the signaling effect described here helps explain why a firm like BountyQuest may fail (1) . 27 Nevertheless, Proposition 2 also suggests that this failure could be welfareenhancing.
Remark 2. (Signaling from the patent-holder) Our analysis omits an interesting signaling issue on the patent-holder side. In our model, an inventor knows her own patent quality. If we alter the timing of the game so that the licensing stage comes before the search stage, an opportunistic patent-holder may be motivated to offer a more favorable license in order to reduce search intensity. But since no honest inventor would do this, this offer reveals the patent-holder's true type and backfires by restoring search incentives.
Multiple Users: Collusion-Proof Mechanism
Two issues arise in the multiple-user case. First, when making his search decision, a searcher may not fully internalize all benefits of a patent challenge (the free rider problem); second, after discovery, a fact-finder may prefer to collude with the patentholder and share the monopoly profit extracted from other users, rather than submit prior art to the patent office or court and invalidate the patent (the collusion problem).
We assume that private players cannot organize themselves to overcome the free rider problem. 28 Concerning collusion, this section devotes to the optimal policy with full collusion deterrence. Section 5 considers a simple case where it may be optimal to accommodate collusion along the equilibrium path.
Referring to Figure 1 , assume that ex ante all users
are equally likely to have search capability. At time 1.5, a player B j , j ∈ {1, . . . , N }, is endowed with this capability, but his identity is unknown to others. 29 Assume 27 According to the company rule, the identity of both bounty posters and hunters are kept secret, and the discovered information is disclosed only to the poster. This should reduce free riding.
28 Note that free riding persists as long as private mechanisms cannot force participation. Another problem is that ex ante it may be difficult to identify potential users.
29 For the collusion-proof mechanism, we mainly deal with the case where only one user can search, and discuss briefly when there are multiple searchers in Appendix B.
uninformed search. After learning v j , and if B j has found the prior art, he then decides whether to collude with A, or to submit the information to P .
In the collusion subgame, we endow A with the whole bargaining power. She makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the fact-finder. As we will show later, A may need to transfer a portion of patent rights (or, equivalently, part of monopoly profit) in a collusive deal. Following the literature on collusion in organizations, we assume that a side contract is enforceable, but introduce a side transfer efficiency parameter to capture imperfect collusion. If A transfersθ of patent rights to a fact-finder, the recipient receives only λθ, λ ∈ [0, 1]. The loss (1−λ)θ can be justified by the possibility that such side transfers may be detected with a probability 1−λ; or, to avoid suspicion, the colluding parties have to trade in an indirect and inefficient way. Note that limited liability has to be satisfied in this subgame, too: A has no cash to pay the fact-finder, and cannot give away more monopoly rights than what she receives from P .
Assume that when there is no patent challenge, all users are subject to the same policy. But when B j submits the prior art, his identity is known to P and so different patent power can be imposed on B j and on other users B −j , while all B −j still face the same policy. To shorten the exposition, we restrict the policy space by assuming that after submission, B j is no longer subject to any licensing obligation. He can freely use the technology and enjoy the whole production surplus v j . 30 A policy, then, is a triplet (θ, θ A , θ c ). As before,θ ≥ θ * is the patent right awarded to A when there is no challenge. When B j submits the prior art, P assigns patent rights with power θ A (θ c ) to A (B j , respectively) against other users B −j .
We first characterize the collusion-free allocation and show that the public goods nature of a private challenge leads to under-search. We then allow collusion. Define S ≡ (N − 1)π. A patent with power θ garners profit θS from other users B −j , which is the source of collusion gains.
Collusion-free allocation and under-search: Suppose no collusion opportunity, λ = 0. When B j cannot demand a contribution from other users, for example, as when the technology has diverse applications, and B j lacks the means to trace potential users, under-search is very likely. 31 Given a policy, denote β s as the privately optimal level of search intensity: (1 − α)(θv e + θ c S) ≡ c ′ (β s ).
30 In section 4.1, we give a sufficient condition for this restriction to be part of the optimal policy. 31 As long asθ ≥ 0, B will submit the prior art when he finds it. Considerθ = θ * and full patent invalidation after challenge, θ A = θ c = 0. Under this policy, the social benefit of search is (1 − α)βθ * D, but the private search incentive is (1 − α)βθ * v e . Under-search ensues whenever N − 1 > π d . To encourage search it may be optimal to reward B j with θ c > 0. Proposition 3. When there are multiple users and no collusion opportunity, the optimalθ = θ * and θ A = 0. It is optimal to transfer a portion of patent rights to the fact-finder, θ c > 0, if
where β s 0 is the privately optimal search intensity atθ = θ * and θ c = 0.
Starting from the ex post efficient policy θ c = 0, a marginal increase of θ c entails deadweight loss of (1 − α)β s 0 (N − 1)d, but society benefits from a more intensive search (∂β s /∂θ c > 0). To balance the two effects, condition (7) says that the optimal policy requires θ c > 0 when the under-search problem is severe (β s 0 low), or when the incentive effect is significant (∂β s /∂θ c large).
Collusion-proof challenge mechanism
To introduce collusion, suppose that when B j has found the prior art, he brings this evidence to A and the latter makes an enforceable take-it-or-leave-it offer. The analysis of the side contracting subgame is significantly simplified by the restriction that B j can freely use the technology post-challenge. Given this restriction, A can only induce B j 's cooperation by promising him a portion of the monopoly rent levied on B −j . In other words, collusion gains flow from the higher profit collected from B −j . Given λ ∈ (0, 1] and patent policy (θ, θ A , θ c ), define ∆θ = λ(θ − θ A ) − θ c , which reflects the gains of trade from collusion. The maximal amount A is willing to pay isθ − θ A , which has to be discounted by λ to reflect the amount transferable to B j ; on the other hand, B j must get at least θ c to participate in collusion. The following lemma characterizes the outcome of side contracting. 32 Lemma 2. Collusion takes place if and only if ∆θ > 0. When ∆θ > 0, in the optimal side contract B j receives a free license and realizes full production surplus v j . 32 We assume A has incentives to make the collusive offer only when it is strictly better to do so.
Since side transfer of patent rights entails an efficiency loss (λ ≤ 1), to economize on its use, A leaves B j the whole production surplus v j by granting the latter a free license in the optimal collusive offer. This in turn implies that P can fully replicate the optimal side contract, thus the collusion-proofness principle holds.
Lemma 3. (Collusion-proofness principle) P optimally deters collusion in the multipleuser, single-challenger case. Now, we can write down P 's optimization program.
Let µ be the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the (CP ) constraint, and define
which reflects the discrepancy between social and private incentives to search. There is over-search (under-search) if ψ < 0 (ψ > 0, respectively).
Suppose N and α are large enough. 33 The optimalθ = θ * , i.e., (IC) A is binding:
increasingθ beyond θ * creates more deadweight loss, strengthens incentives to collude, and encourages private search. But even with under-search, when α is not too small, increasing θ c is a more efficient way of encouraging private search.
For the optimal θ A and θ c , as λ increases from zero to one, we may have three regimes. First note that from λ ≤ 1, the socially least costly way to deter collusion is to re-allocate the patent rights to B j only, with θ c = λθ * and θ A = 0. But this allocation rule may be disturbed by inadequate private search incentives. Referring to (iii) collusion-deterrence cum discouraging search: the optimal 0 < θ A ≤ θ * and 0 ≤ θ c < λθ * , with λ(θ * − θ A ) = θ c . When λ >λ, rewarding B j with λθ * leads to very large over-search costs, relative to deadweight loss savings. Therefore, P dilutes B j 's search incentives by remaining part of the patent rights to A (θ A > 0), while (CP ) is held binding.
Note that in the extreme case of λ = 1, the total patent rights imposed on B −j cannot be reduced after the patent challenge. In order to satisfy the (CP ) constraint, any reduction in θ A is accompanied with the same amount of increase of θ c . There are no social gains from this re-allocation of patent rights, and private search driven by θ c is socially wasteful. It is optimal to set θ A = θ * and θ c = 0.
The finding of prior art only increases the social surplus to the extent that B j can freely use the technology in his own production, which is always internalized by
Proposition 4. Solving the program (P) s , in the optimal policy:
• When λ ≤λ, the patent authority fully deprives the patent-holder of her patent rights, with partial transfer to the challenger (regime (i) and (ii)); but
• when λ >λ, the patent-holder retains (partial) patent rights after a challenge (regime (iii)).
Remark. The restriction that a successful challenger B j is no longer subject to patent control may only change the optimal policy in regime (iii). After challenge, if A retains some monopoly rights against B j , the two may collude even when ∆θ ≤ 0. The collusion problem worsens. 35 The only welfare-enhancing effect of this policy is to discourage private search, which concerns P only in regime (iii). To see this, suppose λ = 1 and θ A = θ * . We still have over-search as in the single-user, uninformed-search case. Proposition 1 then applies. But if condition (4) fails, this restriction becomes part of the optimal policy.
Improving patent quality with challenge
So far in our analysis, patent challenges serve only to reduce ex post deadweight loss.
They may also improve patent quality (α) by inducing innovation or by deterring opportunistic patenting. These benefits limit the relevance of previous results about over-search and the associated optimal policy response, particularly the more lenient policy toward the patent-holder in Proposition 1 and regime (iii) in Proposition 4. 36 For simplicity, consider the setting of section 4.1, i.e. a multiple-user case where only one user searches.
Inducing innovation: Until now, we have used an adverse selection model on the inventor's side by assuming that the honest inventor (one with k = K) cannot game the system with opportunistic patenting. Here we consider a simple moral hazard version which allows an inventor to copy and patent a (equally valuable) technology already in the public domain. After this modification, to induce innovation, the 34 Plus, there is over-search as identified in the single-user case. 35 But the collusion-proofness principle still holds, since in any optimal side offer A grants B j a free license. 36 And Proposition 9 in Appendix B.
inventor's incentive constraint is
We still needθ ≥ θ * to encourage innovation; in addition, a lowerθ calls for a higher β. Put differently, a higher θ c enables higher search and challenge intensity, which benefits society by reducing the patent protection required to induce innovation.
In addition, since θ A now appears in the right-hand side of condition (8), a more lenient policy toward the patent-holder (θ A higher) undermines the incentive power of the patent system. Both effects constrain regime (iii) in Proposition 4.
Deterring opportunistic patenting: Another drawback of the policy θ A > 0 is that it may induce more opportunistic patenting. 37 To illustrate this point, we keep the honest inventor's choice set as in the basic model, but modify the opportunistic inventor's choice set as follows: with probability α ′ ≥ 0, there is a cost c ′ for her to copy the existing technology and prepare for the patent application, with α + α ′ < 1.
With probability 1 − α − α ′ , opportunistic patenting remains costless.
With this structure, the condition to deter opportunistic patenting is
That is, the opportunistic inventor will not spend c ′ if a patent challenge is very likely to happen (β large), and after challenge she gains little (θ A small).
When condition (9) fails, an issued patent is bogus with probability 1 − α ; but when it holds, this probability falls to
Since the condition is more likely to hold with a higher β and lower θ A , for those cases where (CP ) is binding, λ(θ − θ A ) = θ c , increasing θ c yields an additional benefit of a higher patent quality. This concern may increaseλ and shrink regime (iii).
Consider a simple case where B j has a two-point search technology. Assume that existence prior art can be found with a fixed probability β, when cost c is spent. Assume also that λ = 1 and so the (CP ) constraint is θ A + θ c =θ. In a linear structure, it suffices to consider two cases: θ c =θ or θ A =θ. Assume
37 Appendix C.1 considers imposing monetary fine to deter opportunistic patenting.
i.e., search deters costly opportunistic patenting. When θ c =θ and θ A = 0, B j incurs c to search, but the opportunistic inventor will not spend c ′ to pursue the patent. On the other hand, when θ A =θ and θ c = 0, B j doesn't search and the opportunistic inventor spends c ′ .
The difference in social welfare under the two policies is
Less opportunistic patenting improves social welfare by reducing deadweight loss (α ′θ D+ Remark. Under the original assumption outlined in section 2, the honest inventor receives zero rent under the optimal policy while the opportunistic inventor's expected profit is positive. Hence that the latter has stronger incentives to apply for a patent. So even if there is a common positive application cost, opportunistic patenting will occur as long as the honest inventor is willing to engage in R&D and seek patent protection.
As in Caillaud end Duchêne (2005), a uniform application fee cannot solve the patent quality problem.
Sequential Search and Collusion Accommodation
The optimal mechanism in the previous section hinges on the extent of collusion λ, which as been treated as exogenous up to this point in our analysis. In this section,
we consider sequential search and show how λ can be affected by patent quality α. We argue that a lower patent quality alleviates the collusion problem, and provide a case where collusion may be partially accommodated in the optimal mechanism. 39
38 If α ′ = 0, W| θ c =θ − W| θ A =θ < 0 and we are in regime (iii). 39 This section is closely related to previous works on using multiple auditors/supervisors to fight collusion. Laffont and Martimort (1999) considers simultaneous supervision, while Kofman and Lawarrée (1996) and Suppose that two players H 1 and H 2 search sequentially. Let H 1 search first, and assume H 2 makes the search decision after observing whether or not there is a patent challenge. For simplicity, assume that both searchers are not technology users and both are bribable with λ = 1. Also assume that H 1 has a fixed probability β 1 of discovering prior art at no cost. Denote x as the probability that H 1 colludes with A. Observing no challenge from H 1 , H 2 believes that the prior art exists with probability
This belief is decreasing in α and increasing in x, as is H 2 's optimal searching intensity Khalil and Lawarrée (2005) consider sequential supervision as here. In contrast with our setting, Laffont and Martimort (1999) and Kofman and Lawarrée (1996) do not consider moral hazard problem on the supervisors' side, and both papers focus on optimal collusion-proof mechanisms. On the other hand, Khalil and Lawarrée (2005) uses similar ideas to endogenize the collusion efficiency parameter (λ) with respect to the second supervision, and argues that tolerating early collusion is necessary to motivate the second supervision. However, in their auditing model, the second supervisor (an external auditor) is assumed not bribable and is appointed by the principal after the first supervisor (an internal auditor) sends the auditing report. The external auditor is nothing more than a costly "inspection device," and it is the principal's lack of commitment to using this device that causes the incentive problem. When collusion between the agent and the internal auditor is fully deterred, the principal loses incentives to hire the costly external auditor. β x 2 , which is determined by 40
Next, consider the policy toward collusion. We are mainly concerned with the case where H 1 finds the information. But first note that P must θ c =θ to fully deter collusion in all possible events. If H 1 's search fails, we revert to the previous case with H 2 as the sole searcher; thus collusion deterrence requires θ c =θ. This policy also prevents collusion when H 1 finds the information, since A cannot offer a higher bribe.
Social welfare under this policy is
is H 2 's search cost (in this section, when writing the social welfare, we ignore the event of honest inventor). 41 H 2 incurs this cost if and only if he observes no challenge from
In the current setting the full collusion-deterrence policy is dominated by the optimal full accommodation policy θ c = 0. If P tolerates collusion whenever someone finds the information, the deadweight loss is alwaysθD, and θ c only affects H 2 's search incentives through the side payment he receives. But since no patent challenge would occur after the discovery of prior art, any search is purely a rent-seeking activity. The optimal θ c is equal to zero in order to discourage such waste. Social welfare under the optimal full collusion-accommodation policy is (1 − α)(V −θD), greater than the level under the full collusion-deterrence policy.
This result hinges on the assumptions that λ = 1 and that patent challenges provide no ex ante benefits. If λ < 1, then in determine which policy is superior, θ c = λθ or 0, the search cost saving c 2 of the latter policy must be compared with the lower deadweight loss of the former policy.
When θ c ∈ (0,θ), collusion occurs if H 2 alone succeeds in finding the prior art. If H 1 finds and brings the information to A, their bargain is influenced by the probability that H 2 finds the information as well. In that case, either H 2 challenges the patent and spoils the collusive deal between H 1 and A, or H 2 also colludes with A and shares inθ. 42 Assume that x, the probability that A colludes with H 1 , is not observable to 40 We keep the assumption that A has the whole bargaining power in the collusive subgame. Therefore, when H 2 has found prior art, he always gets θ c Π whether from challenging the patent or from colluding with A.
41 The privately optimal search intensity is determined by condition (10), with x = 0 and θ c =θ. 42 Note that the assumption of an enforceable side contract prevents H 1 from running to the patent authority after accepting a side offer. For A, since she is protected by limited liability and θ A = 0, when H 2 challenges the patent, A cannot pay the promised bribe. 
2 )θ, A colludes with H 1 with probability one;
Note that for all x, there is a unique θ c,x satisfying θ c,x ≡ [1 − β x 2 (θ c,x )]θ. By condition (10), search intensity β x 2 (θ c,x ) is increasing in θ c,x and strictly positive for any θ c,x > 0. In addition, this unique θ c,x is decreasing in x. 43 We will focus on the partial deterrence equilibrium even when there are multiple equilibria in the collusive subgame (i.e., when 0 < θ c ≤θ/2). This selection could be justified by the introduction of a nonbribable type of H 2 . When there is some probability that H 2 will challenge the patent, H 1 will demand a side payment higher than θ c . Thus, the collusion accommodation equilibrium could be eliminated by this perturbation of the game. Remark. The fact that H 2 challenges the patent when θ c <θ implies that A has colluded with H 1 . However, P cannot use this information to punish A and H 1 as A is protected by limited liability, and H 1 's identity may be unknown to P .
Lemma 4 leads key results in this section. We first consider the impact of α, then turn to the optimality of allowing partial collusion between A and H 1 . Fixing x and θ c , the privately optimal search intensity β x 2 is decreasing in α, i.e., all else being equal, H 2 43 To see this, insert θ c,x into condition (10):
When x increases, the belief in the left-hand side increases, and so we must have a higher β has less incentive to search when patent quality improves. Since both (1 − β x 2 )/(2 − β x 2 ) and 1 − β x 2 are decreasing in β x 2 , less collusion occurs as patent quality worsens. In case (ii), for instance, where A colludes with H 1 only with some probability, given the policy pair θ c andθ, a lower α boosts H 2 's search incentives. To maintain θ c = (1 − βx 2 )θ, A and H 1 collude less (x lower). Alternatively, a lower α requires a smaller θ c to achieve the same level of collusionx.
Proposition 6. Consider sequential search and the event when H 1 has found the information. A lower patent quality alleviates the collusion problem. That is, given the policy θ c , a lower α is associated with less collusion in this event.
Next, let us consider the welfare consequence of partial collusion accommodation.
Tolerating collusion between H 1 and A may be beneficial because it boosts H 2 's search incentive. The more H 2 is motivated to search, the more demanding H 1 is in a collusive offer, and this relaxes the condition to deter collusion between H 2 and A. To evaluate welfare effect, we compare two policies: one prevents A from colluding with H 1 while the other allows them to collude with probabilityx ∈ (0, 1). We check when the latter policy generates higher social welfare.
Suppose θ c <θ. When H 1 finds the information but doesn't collude with A, social welfare is
where, by Lemma 4, θ c,0 ≡ (1 − β 0 2 )θ is rewarded to H 1 when he submits the information. H 2 searches except when H 1 challenges the patent. On the other hand, if P allows A and H 1 to collude with probabilityx ∈ (0, 1), by Lemma 4, P only needs to set θ c,x ≡ (1 − βx 2 )θ < θ c,0 . 44 Social welfare under this policy is
The policy θ c,x applies when H 1 finds and submits the information to the patent authority, or when H 1 colludes with A but later H 2 challenges the patent;θ applies
But this inequality leads to (1 − α)β 1x ≥ β 1x , and therefore cannot be true.
when only H 1 has found the prior art and colludes with A, or when only H 2 's search succeeds.
Comparing W| x=0 with W|x, the policy θ c,x may reduce the deadweight loss associated with the patent rights:
A sufficient condition to guarantee that this difference is positive is to have βx 2 (1 −x) increasing inx. That is, βx 2 is sensitive enough tox; and this can be achieved by, say, a small enough c ′′ 2 . 45 But note that this policy also entails a larger search cost to H 2 . It generates a higher search intensity (βx 2 > β 0 2 ) and induces H 2 to search more often; H 2 searches even when H 1 has found the information but colludes with A. Balancing the benefit with the cost, we have the following result. 46 Proposition 7. In the case of sequential search, the collusion-proofness principle may not hold. Collusion between the patent-holder and the first fact-finder is more likely to be optimally accommodated when the second searcher has a lower search cost (c 2 smaller), and when his search intensity is more sensitive to the occurrence of collusion and the according belief adjustment (c ′′ 2 smaller).
Remark. For the optimality of θ A = 0, previous analysis suggests that the only reason to maintain θ A > 0 is to discourage private search. But here P wants to use H 2 's search to help relaxing the collusion constraint, so it will not be optimal to dampen H 2 's search incentives. 47
45 Incorporating θ c,x ≡ (1 − βx 2 )θ into condition (10), βx 2 andx satisfy
A smaller c . 47 In addition, a strictly positive θ A may facilitate collusion, for A can use this to pay the bribe to H 1 even when H 2 challenges the patent.
Concluding Remarks
We have looked at a patent challenge mechanism that uses patent rights to encourage the submission of patent-defeating information. We believe this mechanism is more appropriate than, for example, bounties due to the public authority's information constraint. To deter collusion, the patent authority needs to have an idea of how serious the problem is, i.e., the authority must apprehend the size of the side contracting efficiency parameter λ in our model. On top of this, in a bounty scheme, the amount of a monetary reward should also reflect the value of the patented technologyV . Setting the bounty too low will nott induce information submission. Too high a bounty entails additional cost if its source is public funds. A bounty paid by the patent-holder may not feasible because limited liability makes her judgement-proof, especially when the patent-holder is a small firm or an individual inventor.
We conclude the paper with two remarks about implementation. Although we have illustrated several situations where, from an ex post point of view, over-search may ensue and so the optimal policy may require the original patent-holder and challenger to share patent rights, we feel that these cases do not weigh heavily in policy construction.
For those ex ante benefits discussed in section 4.2, we may still want to encourage rather than discourage patent challenges. 48 An empirical evaluation is indispensable in determining the optimal re-allocation of patent rights.
Lastly, we may further pin down the key parameter λ with a more involved market structure than the simple setting in this paper. For instance, when technology users compete in the product market, partial invalidation of a patent will intensify competition and hurt a challenger. Collusion may be more severe in this case. Alternatively, when there are spillover or positive network effects of technology adoption that are not appropriable via patent rights, a fact-finder may have less incentive to collude with the patent-holder in order to realize these benefits. Knowledge of market interactions may help to determine the collusion parameter λ, and so the patent rights need to be transferred to the challenger.
Appendix

A Proofs
Proposition 1
Proof. The optimality ofθ = θ * is trivial. To show that the optimal θ A > 0 if condition (4) holds, the corresponding first-order condition evaluated at Θ * is
which is positive if
Q.E.D.
Lemma 1
Proof. First note that a low-value type user always gets zero surplus overθ and θ A , whatever the pricing strategy of the patent-holder. In equilibrium his search intensitŷ β l is determined according to (5) .
Given (β h ,β l ), denote the updated belief as ρ ∅ (ρ p ) when nothing is found (the prior art is found, respectively), with
Consider first the pure strategy equilibrium.
⋄ Suppose β h =β l in equilibrium, then nothing can be learned from the search result,
The opportunistic inventor sets the licensing fee at v h whether there is challenge or not. The high-value type user gets
He will deviate to a higher level of search intensity, and so this can't be an equilibrium.
⋄ For an equilibrium with different intensities, first note thatβ h >β l in any equilibrium; otherwise, ρ ∅ > ρ ≥ρ along the equilibrium path, while ρ p ≷ρ. Then monopoly price remains at v h if no challenge, and when there is challenge, the lower bound of the high-value B's surplus is (1−θ A )v h . But then the equilibriumβ h >β l , a contradiction, for the minimal equilibrium intensity solves
Fromβ h >β l , along the equilibrium path, beliefs are such that ρ p > ρ > ρ ∅ and ρ p >ρ. The optimal pricing when the prior art is found is v h . Depending on ρ ∅ ≷ρ :
(i) if ρ ∅ <ρ, the opportunistic inventor sets licensing fee at v l over θ A , but then the high-value user's optimal search intensity solves
This leads to a contradiction as (θ
(ii) if ρ ∅ ≥ρ, the opportunistic inventor sets licensing fee at v h over θ A , the optimal search intensity is determined by
For this to be an equilibrium,β h cannot be to large. The necessary and sufficient condition of existence is ρ ∅ (β t ) ≥ρ, i.e. condition (6) .
⋄ If condition (6) fails, there is no pure equilibrium, but exists an equilibrium where
• the honest inventor always offers a licensing fee v h . The opportunistic inventor offers a licensing fee v h in the case of patent challenge; otherwise, she randomizes the price by offering v l with probability x ∈ (0, 1); • the low-value user always choosesβ l ; and the high-value user chooses β h x ∈ (β l ,β h ), where x and β h x satisfy
The existence and uniqueness of β h x ∈ (β l ,β h ) is guaranteed by the failure of condition (6) . Once β h x is fixed, the corresponding unique x ∈ (0, 1) can be found. In this equilibrium, the high-value user reduces his searching intensity to β h x so that by observing no challenger, the opportunistic inventor updates the belief toρ and is indifferent between two offers v h and v l . She chooses v l with probability x. This lower offer in turn increases the high-value user's return when not finding the prior art, and therefore justifies a lower search intensity.
Proposition 3
Proof. In the collusion-free case, the optimalθ = θ * and θ A = 0. There is no point to reward the patent-holder A; and to encourage private search P can do better by raising θ c instead ofθ. For θ c , first note that the optimal private search intensity β s satisfies (1 − α)(θ * v e + θ c S) ≡ c ′ (β s ), with β s strictly increasing in θ c . Social welfare is
The optimal θ c > 0 if condition (7) holds at θ c = 0.
Lemma 2
Proof. A general side contract specifies that (i) B j reports to A his value v j and promises not to challenge the patent; (ii) in return, A transfers a portion of patent rights again B −j to B j , which is denoted asθ t −j , t ∈ {l, h}; and (iii) B j with value v t , t ∈ {l, h}, can use the technology on his own production and generate a surplus (1 −θ t j )v t , and possibly pays a fee f t to A. From the limited liability constraint and patent policy, f t ≥ 0 andθ t −j ≤θ. Suppose A makes the side offer {θ t −j ,θ t j , f t } t=h,l . The optimal side offer solves the following program (suppose both types of B j participate in the collusion)
Assume A colludes if and only if the payoff is strictly larger than outside option:Ũ A > θ A S. Define τ t ≡ λθ t −j S − f t as the net transfer from A to B, when v j = v t , t = h, l. In order to induce participation, τ t ≥ 0. A's payoff can be written as
From λ ≤ 1, side transfer of patent rights entails loss to A as well. Therefore for a given τ t ≥ 0, if f t > 0, and soθ t −j > 0, the payoff of A can be increased by decreasing both f t andθ t −j while keeping τ t at the same level. In an optimal collusion offer, B j pays no fee for his production, f h = f l = 0.
Next, to satisfy (CIR), we must have (λθ t −j − θ c )S ≥θ t j v t ≥ 0, for both t, and so λθ t −j ≥ θ c . But then A's payoff from collusion is
if ∆θ ≤ 0. Collusion doesn't take place in this case. On the other hand, if ∆θ ≥ 0, a feasible collusion offer is λθ t −j = θ c , andθ t j = 0, for both t. By this offer, A's payoff is strictly greater than when no collusion. This is also the optimal side offer, since anỹ θ t j > 0 necessarily increasesθ t −j in order to satisfy (CIR) t j , which is costly to A. There is no benefit to screen v j in this case. B j gets a free license to fully produce v j in a collusion offer. The payoff of A at the optimal side offer isŨ s A = (θ − θ c λ )S. Finally, consider if A screens v j by partial collusion, i.e. to collude only with one type of B j . Suppose A offers (θ −j ,θ j ) such that only one type's participation is satisfied (the same argument holds so that it is optimal to se f = 0). First, it cannot be the case that only B j with high-value participates, for v h > v l contradicts with partial collusion with high-value type,θ j v l > (λθ −j − θ c )S − f ≥θ j v h . And second, to partial collude with low-value type, it requiresθ j v h > (λθ −j − θ c )S − f ≥θ j v l , and soθ j > 0 and λθ −j > θ c . But from ∆θ > 0 and λθ −j > θ c , doing so pays A less than full collusion,
Lemma 3
Proof. The proof of Lemma 2 shows that an optimal collusion offer contains only a side transfer of patent rightsθ −j ≥ 0, and A doesn't screen B j 's type. Therefore P can and should incorporate the optimal side contract into the patent policy in order to avoid the efficiency loss (1 − λ)θ −j S entailed in the sid transfer. Note that this doesn't affect B j 's searching incentives for B j 's binding participation constraint at the collusion game. Searching incentives are solely determined by the patent policy.
Proposition 4
Proof. To derive the shape of program (P) s 's solution, first note that the optimal θ = θ * . For if not, we can decreaseθ by a small amount ǫ > 0, and increase θ c by ǫv e /S < ǫ, if N large enough (N ≥ 3 suffices). The search intensity is unchanged, and from α > 2 N +2 the social welfare is increased by
Next, ignore (IC) A , and denote the Lagrangian as L s , F OCs are
where
We further assume c ′′′ ≥ 0 in order to satisfy the second-order condition. This guarantees that ∂ 2 β s /∂θ A2 ≤ 0.
Define the following terms: β s λ by (1 − α)(θ * v e + λθ * S) ≡ c ′ (β s λ ),
Note that β s λ is increasing in λ, while ψ λ is decreasing in λ, and so φ λ increasing in λ. Also define λ,λ, andλ by φ(λ) ≡ 0, ψ(λ) ≡ 0, and Λ(λ) ≡ 0, respectively.λ's existence is guaranteed by assuming N large enough (more precisely, N − 1 > 3π m2 /d 2 ), so that Λ strictly decreasing in λ over λ ≥λ; andλ >λ. On the other hand, λ may not exist.
When exists, it satisfies λ <λ <λ.
With these definitions, when evaluating at θ c = λθ * and θ A = 0, F OCs can be written as
This policy is optimal if there exists µ ≥ 0 such that (13) is non-positive, and (14) equals to zero. The three regimes are (i) λ ∈ [0, λ), if λ exists. In this case, φ λ < 0, (14) is strictly positive, the optimal θ c > λθ * . This in turn implies that (CP ) slacks, and so µ = 0. From (11), the optimal θ A = 0.
(ii) λ ∈ [λ,λ]: this regime can be further divided into two cases. For λ ∈ [λ,λ], both φ λ and ψ λ are non-negative. Let µ = (1 − α)φ λ ≥ 0 and plug it into (13), which then becomes non-positive. The policy θ c = λθ * and θ A = 0 is optimal. Suppose λ ∈ [λ,λ]
and µ = (1 − α)φ λ . Although ψ λ ≤ 0 in this range, by Λ ≥ 0, (13) is still non-positive.
(iii) λ ∈ (λ, 1]: in this case, by Λ < 0, there exists no µ ≥ 0 such that (13) non-positive
and (14) non-negative. And in any optimal µ, condition (14) cannot be non-negative.
For this leads to µ > 0, and again by Λ < 0, (13) is also positive. (CP ) slacks, contradictory to µ > 0. We then conclude that in optimal, (13) must be strictly positive and (14) strictly negative. The optimal policy satisfies θ c < λθ * , θ A > 0, and (CP ) binding. (To further derive the optimal θ A , we can rewrite the program as a function of θ A only. We omit it here.) Lastly, when λ = 1, for any distribution of θ c and θ A that makes (CP ) binding, it must be ψ < 0, and so condition (11) is strictly greater than (12) . The optimal θ A = θ * and θ c = 0. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4
Proof. When 0 < θ c <θ/2, if H 1 believes that H 2 won't challenge the patent, then he will accept A's side offer θ c . This leaves A enough to bribe H 2 when the latter also comes with the information. There is always an equilibrium where collusion is fully accommodated. Even if H 1 believes that H 2 will challenge the patent, the maximal bribe he'll ask is θ c /(1 − β 1 2 ). And so, with θ c > 0, as long as
<θ/2, A must be able to collude with both fact-finders.
On the other hand, if θ c ≥
, A won't be able to offer two bribes when H 1 charges the high side payment. In addition, when θ c ≥θ/2, there is no way for A to collude with both H 1 and H 2 for each party demands at least θ c to hide the prior art.
, expecting that H 2 will search with intensity β x 2 and will not collude with A, H 1 needs to be bribed with the amount θ c /(1 − β x 2 ). Since, given that H 1 has found the prior art, A's maximal willingness to pay isθ, (i) if θ c /(1 − β 1 2 ) <θ, there is collusion between H 1 and A, and H 2 sets his search intensity at β 1 2 ; (ii) if (1 − β 1 2 )θ ≤ θ c < (1 − β 0 2 )θ, then A plays the mixed strategy and colludes with H 1 with probabilityx, while H 2 searches with probability βx 2 , such that A is indifferent between colluding with H 1 or not, i.e. the necessary bribe is θ c /(1 − βx 2 ) =θ; and (iii) if θ c /(1 − β 0 2 ) ≤θ, there is no collusion between H 1 and A, and H 2 sets his search intensity at β 0 2 . Note that we've ignored the renegotiation in our reasoning, i.e., once the side contract is reached, H 1 will insist on the payment A has promised. This can be justified by the assumption that only A, but not H 1 , observes whether H 2 has found the information or not. This assumption implies that H 1 receives no new information after signing the side contract, and so the outside option keeps the same in a renegotiation.
If, due to H 2 's finding of the information, H 1 agrees A's request to lower the side payment, then A will send this request whether H 2 really finds the prior art or not (if H 2 fails, A could simply arrange someone else to pretend to be a fact-finder). Due to this opportunistic behavior, H 1 will insist on a payment at least θ c (the outside payoff) in a renegotiation.
B Some Extensions
Commercial success doctrine: Over-search under the single-user case could also be alleviated by the commercial success doctrine. 49 Commercial success is a secondary consideration that a court may take into account when deciding a patent's validity, notably whether it is nonobvious. Absent any direct evidence, an issued patent is deemed more likely to be nonobvious if it enjoys commercial success in the market. 50 Although scholars have criticized this doctrine on the grounds that commercial success is usually a poor signal of a patent's technology merit (k in our model), 51
this doctrine has an attractive feature to discourage search in the current context.
This welfare-enhancing effect doesn't hinge on the information the commercial success conveys about k.
Consider the setting of section 3 with uninformed search, and fix a policy Θ. 52
Without this doctrine, social welfare iŝ
where the private search intensityβ is determined by condition (2) . Suppose now the court employs the commercial success doctrine and rejects any patent challenge from the high-value user, when v can be verified in court. 53 Assume A can learn and generate hard evidence of the true value v (after realization) at a cost ι. 54 Let ι > d so 49 Another possibility is an abolished doctrine called "licensee estoppel", which forbids a licensee from challenging the licensed patent. See Merges (1997) .
50 In Graham vs. John Deere Company, 1966, the Supreme Court expresses that:" Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy." See also Merges (1997) .
51 Merges (1997) : "Commercial success is a poor indicator of patentability because it depends for its effectiveness on a long chain of inferences, and because the links in the chain are often subject to doubt."
52 To save space, we don't consider the optimal policy design in the presence of this doctrine, but only point out its effect. Note that our analysis covers the status quo, where θ A = 0 <θ. 53 Since we have assumed that the prior art indicates with certainty that the issued patent fails the patentability criteria, no secondary factor is needed. Direct application of commercial success here doesn't fit the practice as stated in the Supreme Court opinion. However, one may mitigate the difference by assuming that the user acquires an informative but noisy signal of k.
54 When information asymmetry comes from market demand, A may hire a consultant to do a market that A will not spend ι in the absence of a patent challenge. 55 When facing a challenge,
A incurs ι and submits the evidence to the court if
commercial success doctrine restores the private search intensity to the socially optimal level β * , determined by the first-order condition (3). Social welfare is
where Proposition 8. In the single-user, uninformed search case, enacting the commercial success doctrine discourages private search. This increases social welfare when the cost difference between privately and socially optimal search intensity is large enough,
The benefit of the commercial success doctrine can be easily extended to the multiuser case, where B, the user possessing the search and challenge capacity, is the dominant user. To see this, suppose that, in addition to the major user B, there is also a 55 If ι ≤ d, then A will incur ι, set licensing fee at v, and extract the full production surplus. Monopoly entails no deadweight loss. It is optimal to set θ A =θ > θ * and suppress any private search (the patent protection should be strictly higher than θ * in order to compensate for the cost ι). 56 Assume that the challenger submits the prior art as long as he finds it. When B learns v = v l , he has every incentive to do so. When v = v h , although his challenge is rejected, B is indifferent between submitting or not as there is no challenge fee. We assume, then, that he submits. This can be justified by a small probability that the doctrine is not applied.
value from these small users, which is also a random variable. Suppose A licenses to screen each b i 's type, and the aggregate deadweight loss is θD b . Relative to B's production,
From (i), B's value dominates in the total value of the technology; and from (ii), B's high value always generates over-search.
For simplicity, assume there is no collusion opportunity, and all users are subject to the same policy, whether there is patent challenge. Assume only B can search and challenge the patent, while other users free ride on B's efforts. The social benefit to search now is the total deadweight loss, (1− ρ)v l + D b , which, by assumption, is strictly smaller than B's private incentives to search v e . Without commercial success doctrine, there is again over-search.
Define the extent of commercial success as the technology's total value. For our purpose, it suffices to have a signal indicating whether the total value falls in the high
the court adopts the commercial success doctrine and rejects B's challenge when A submits the evidence that the technology's total value is in the high range. In contrast with the previous analysis, the commercial success doctrine now leads to under-search, since the social benefit D b is not internalized by B. However, the optimality to employ this doctrine is guaranteed as long as the cost-saving is large, or D b is insignificant, i.e. small users are really "small."
Simultaneous search and the collusion-proof mechanism: Here we consider how the optimal mechanism characterized in Proposition 4 should be modified if two users search simultaneously. Assume the two searchers decide the search intensity simultaneously with common cost c(·), the search results are realized independently, and the number of users is large enough. To be comparable with section 4, we assume that when one searcher has found the prior art, he observes whether the other has also found it. The only friction in collusion therefore is the loss in transfer 1 − λ. 57 For simplicity, keep the policy restriction to exempt a user from licensing obligation when he submits the prior art. A policy is still a triplet (θ, θ A , θ c ), but now θ c is assumed shared equally if both searchers have found and submitted the information. 58 57 Otherwise, if only A observes how many users have found the information, she has incentives to claim that both have found it in order to reduce the collusive offer when, in fact, only one has found the information. Knowing this, the fact-finder won't accept such an offer and so collusion may breakdown even when there are gains from doing so. 58 We use a "no arbitrage" argument to justify the implicit assumption that the patent rights allocation
The collusion-proofness principle holds, and the (CP ) constraint is the same as in previous section, although the collusion gains reduces to a proportion of (N − 2)π when both have found the information. We first look for the symmetric equilibrium in search intensity, denoted as β m . Given the other chooses β m , a searcher's optimal intensity is determined by
For the same policy, it is easy to see that β m < β s . The other's search reduces one's incentives to search because of (i) the sharing of the prize when both have found the information; and (ii) free-riding, i.e. when θ c <θ, one can profit from a lower patent power due to the other's search. In addition, the policy's incentive effect to boost search is also weaker: when measured at the same policy and β,
The optimization program for P is
Besides the difference in search intensity, the introduction of another searcher slightly reduces the loss of the policy when both have found the information to (N − 2)d. The optimal policy still takes the shape of three regimes: only when suboptimal private incentives to search become a serious concern will the optimal policy depart from the less costly way to deter collusion, θ c = λθ * ; 59 but the ranges of the three regimes may be affected. For instance, consider a very small λ so that collusion is not the dominant concern. Although free riding lowers private incentives to search, and so P is more after challenge cannot depend on the number of challengers. Suppose, say, θ c is higher when there are two challengers. If only one has found the prior art, the unique fact-finder can reveal the information to any third party and realize the higher payoff. By the same toke, θ A is independent of the number of challengers. 59 Large N and α guarantee the optimality ofθ = θ * for similar argument in the proof of Proposition 4.
willing to give additional reward, a smaller incentive effect of policy (∂β m /∂θ c < ∂β s /∂θ c ) also makes it more costly to restore search intensity. This trade-off may expand or shrink regime (i), relative to the previous case. Similar reasoning holds at the high end of λ, where duplication of search cost worsens the over-search problem.
As an example, suppose c(β) = Cβ 2 /2 and N → ∞. 60 The next proposition shows that, relative to the single search case, in simultaneously multiple-search regime (i) shrinks while regime (iii) may or may not expand. Proof. Suppose c(β) = C 2 β 2 , with C > 0. When evaluated atθ = θ * , optimal private search intensities and the policy θ c 's incentive effects are
To consider the limiting case N → ∞, we let C be proportional to N in order to constrain β s below one. In particular, solving λ and λ in the proof of Proposition 4, as N → ∞,
forλ is the positive root of
Since a reward of θ c = λθ * stops atλ, to ensure β s < 1 when N → ∞, we require
(i). To show that regime (i) shrinks, denote the Lagrangian of program (P) m as L m , and the multiplier of (CP ) as µ. When evaluating at θ A = 0 and θ c = λθ = λθ * , the 60 To keep β s < 1, we let C be proportional to N . See the proof.
FOC with respect to θ c is
where ψ λ is as defined in the proof of Proposition 4. At λ, by definition,
As N → ∞,
For N sufficiently large, the comparison is dominated by N 2 . Collecting relevant terms (and ignore (1 − α)θ * ),
Therefore, for N large enough, regime (i) shrinks when there are two searchers.
(ii). To show that regime (iii) may expand, by the same token, atλ, by ∂L m /∂θ c = 0, the FOC with respect to θ A is
When evaluated atλ and θ c =λθ * , the sign of FOC is determined by
Since atλ, as N → ∞,
for N sufficiently large the sign of FOC is determined by
∂θ A is strictly positive, and so regime (iii) expands. Even if π 2 > 3d 2 , considering the terms of N , for N sufficiently large, FOC is strictly positive whenever
As long as
, or, π 4 + 4π 3 d + π 2 d 2 − 14πd 3 − 14d 4 < 0, there exists C such that regime (iii) expands when there are two searchers. Otherwise, regime (iii) shrinks.
Q.E.D. Bounty paid by technology users: Given the ex post participation constraint, i.e. the option of not using the technology, to require technology users to pay the bounty is equivalent to granting patent rights to the successful challenger. The same collusion problem emerges if the bounty is not large enough. Even if there is no collusion opportunity, to avoid the deadweight loss the patent authority may want to restrict the amount of bounty. Then we end up with a compulsory licensing scheme.
C An Evaluation of the Bounty System
From the court's reluctancy to adopt this policy, it doesn't seem to be a viable choice. 61
C.1 Private bounty paid by the patent-holder
If the bounty is paid by the patent-holder A, as suggested by Thomas (2001) , this serves as a punishment to opportunistic patenting. The quality of issued patents will improve since the incentives to apply for a bogus patent are lower. However, this punishment may at the same time discourage the honest inventor (denoted as A h ), if there is some probability of "type II" error, i.e. a good patent (when k = K) is struck down. We show that type II error constrains the feasibility and effectiveness of this bounty. 62 To allow for punishment, we need to relax the assumption that A is protected by limited liability. 63 Then our argument that a private bounty may not be optimal can be seen as a justification of this constraint.
Patent quality: For simplicity, we consider the case of single-user, uninformed
search. The next lemma shows that absent type II error, the principle of maximum deterrence holds (Baron and Besanko, 1984 ). An arbitrarily large bounty discourages patenting from the opportunistic inventor (denoted as A o ), this in turn reduces search intensity. Both the probability of opportunistic patenting and search intensity tend to zero. Social welfare approaches to the maximal possible level under the policy (θ * , 0). 
. And optimal z b :
For b large enough, there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium withβ b = θ * π/(θ * π+b)
andẑ b ∈ (0, 1). As b → ∞, bothβ b andẑ b go to zero. Social welfare
Remark. In the multi-user case, this bounty by itself cannot deter collusion, as it is merely a zero-sum transfer between the two colluding parties. The gains from collusion, i.e. the rent extracted from other users, are not affected. But a bounty changes the threat point at the collusion bargaining, and reduces A o 's return from patenting. The opportunistic patenting takes place less often, and its rare occurrence alleviates the collusion problem.
Type II error: Let us modify the information structure to introduce type II error. For any β, assume probability εβ ∈ (0, β) of finding the prior art when k = K.
With the discovery of prior art, the updated probability that k = 0 is
.
The introduction of ε dilutes the information value of prior art. But we keep it small enough so that the prior art remains an informative signal about k = 0, and assume P invalidates the patent after submission, θ A = 0. 64 A policy consists of two elements:
the patent protectionθ when there is no challenge, and the bounty b ≥ 0 paid by A when the prior art is submitted. Given a pair (θ, b), expected profits are
where z is the probability that A o applies for a patent. Suppose P wants to induce innovation, U h A ≥ 0. Social welfare is
The following lemma shows that the optimal policy exhibits a "bang-bang" property: either there is no deterrence (z = 1 and b = 0), or opportunistic patenting is fully deterred (z = 0), if such a policy is feasible.
Lemma 6. Suppose ε > 0. The optimal policy is (i) either no bounty, b = 0 and
64 There is no point to punish the inventor by b and reward her with θ A at the same time.
Proof. For the no-deterrence regime. When ε and β > 0, for any b ≥ 0, to satisfy U h A ≥ 0 we must setθ > θ * . If at b > 0, U o A > 0 and so A o applies for a patent for sure, a small reduction of b doesn't alter this behavior. But this change decreasesθ and search intensity β. Both increase welfare under single-user case. Next, consider the deterrence regime,
If we maintainθ the same, but slightly decrease b while keeping U o A < 0, then β is reduced and U h A increases. This reduction in b is feasible and welfare-enhancing.
Consider decreasingθ by a small amount δ θ < 0, while keeping b the same. To keep U o A = 0, the new equilibrium must have a lower β. Denote the change as δ β < 0. For this to be true, we must have After some manipulation, it can be seen that δ W > 0. As long as the change is small enough, and so δ β not too large, we can keep U h A > 0. This change is feasible. Lastly, to show the optimal z = 0. From U h A = U o A = 0, in equilibrium the patent protection requiredθ d is solely determined by parameters K, π, and ε, and the search intensity β d is decreasing in b. Since A o is indifferent between applying for a patent or not, and a low β increases social welfare, it is optimal to select z = 0.
At the no-deterrence regime, a bounty b > 0 has no direct welfare effect, but increases search intensity β and the patent protectionθ needed to induce innovation.
Both decrease social welfare. On the other hand, if P wants to deter opportunistic patenting, at the optimal policy there is full deterrence, z = 0, but the bounty is set at no more than necessary, i.e. U o A = 0, since raising b comes with a cost of corresponding increase inθ.
We first claim that when ε > 0, the deterrence bounty may not be feasible. 
where β 0 is the search intensity when b = 0, there is no feasible patent policyθ ≤ 1 to implement such a bounty. Condition (15) is more likely to hold if ε is higher, or if K is larger so that absent any punishment, b = 0, an honest inventor needs stronger patent protectionθ to induce innovation.
Second, the deterrence bounty may be too costly. To show this, suppose K ≤
(1 − ε)π. From Lemma 6, in any deterrence equilibrium U h A = U o A = 0, then 65
While in the no-deterrence regime, the optimal policy is
We haveθ n <θ d and β n ≷ β d . The difference of social welfare is
Suppose both the cost difference and ε are not large enough to dominate the comparison. Relative to no deterrence, the deterrence policy increases the social welfare by thwarting opportunistic patenting that cannot be detected by β n , at the expense of a higher protection θ d in order to compensate A h . As α increases, deterring opportunistic patenting becomes more costly, and it may not be optimal to do so. 66
Proposition 10. When there is no risk of invalidating a good patent (no type II error), it is optimal to set a private bounty as large as possible to deter opportunistic patenting.
When there is type II error, (i) the deterrence bounty is not feasible if condition (15) holds; and (ii) even feasible, it is not optimal to deter opportunistic patenting if the quality of issued patents is not too low (if α large enough). 65 The existence of optimal b d > 0 is guaranteed by the property of cost function c, especially c ′ (1) = ∞. 66 It is easy to confirm this point with a two-point searching technology, i.e. B has an exogenous probability β to find the prior art by incurring a fixed search cost.
C.2 Public bounty
Lastly, let us consider a bounty financed by public funds. To keep consistency, public funds are assumed available to reward the innovation as well, i.e. a prize scheme is also considered. We compare different policy combinations: using the public fund only to encourage innovation (a research grant), only to encourage patent challenge (a public bounty), to do both, or none. 67 In general, public funds also entail social cost. Instead of the standard shadow cost of tax collection, we introduce this cost by the information constraint of the patent authority. Suppose there is a mass M of rent-seekers. They can "attack" a prize or public bounty system by producing fake patent applications and defeating prior arts with a very small cost δ > 0. By a fake patent application, we mean one seeks to patent an invention that has no value, and there exists evidence to show that it doesn't meet the patentability criteria. Suppose A is not among those rent-seekers, 68 but P cannot distinguish between a patent application from A or rent-seekers.
Consider the setting of section 4.1, multiple-user with single search. For simplicity, we ignore the search cost, and fix the search intensity β. Suppose the policy cannot depend on the volume of patent applications or challenges. 69 When patents are the only policy tool, P 's optimization program is (P) s in section 4.1, with c = 0 and β fixed. Absent search cost, the optimal re-allocation is governed by collusion concerns (regime (ii)). The patent-holder gets a patent with θ * when no challenge, and the fact-finder gets λθ * by submitting the prior art. Since a patent is useless to them, no rent-seekers spend δ to produce fake applications. When public funds are introduced, consider where the money is spent:
Challenge only (a public bounty but not a prize system): to overcome the collusion problem the bounty should be at least λθ * S. The patent is entirely invalidated after the challenge, and full production surplus V e is realized. But a positive bounty attracts rent-seekers. Each of them incurs δ to apply for a patent and then invalidates it, with 67 We don't let P mix the two regimes in the same stage, e.g., we don't allow P to reward an inventor partly by patent and partly by a prize. Given our linear structure of the model, this should not be a restriction.
68 Alternatively, we can assume that A has the ability to produce the bogus and useless patent, but this activity doesn't crowd out her effort to spend k and bring the useful innovation.
69 Since P cannot discriminate a useful invention from a fake invention, doing so simply dilutes the reward the true inventor receives.
social welfare
Innovation plus challenge : if no patent rights are granted, there is no efficiency loss on production. To encourage innovation, the research prize should be at least K > 0; and to encourage challenge, the bounty should be at least as large as the research prize. 70 Rent-seekers rush to the patent office to win the higher of these two.
Social welfare is
Innovation only : suppose P rewards innovation with a prize b p ≥ K, and encourages prior art submission with collusion-deterrence patent rights θ p . Rent-seekers incur δM to get the prize b p , but not challenge it. Social welfare is
Not surprisingly, public funds should not be used when there is heavy rent-seeking activity. For M large enough, a pure patent system is superior to alternatives incorporating public funds. A more interesting point is that, a pure reward scheme dominates the other two regimes with public funds: W i+c is greater than W i and W c . This implies that, if we don't want to abandon the patent system and switch to the prize system, probably we should not adopt the public bounty either.
Proposition 11. The effectiveness of using public funds in the innovation policy is constrained by the rent-seeking problem. And a pure public bounty is not optimal.
Remark. Here the rent-seeking is introduced in a way such that there is only a "fixed cost" δM associated with public funds. It implies, once this cost is incurred, the full 70 Note that a challenge doesn't improve social welfare here. Again, this is because we've assumed away the incentive effect of the challenge on innovation. Instead, if A chooses between a research project requiring cost K, or applying for a prize on an existing technology (with cost 0) and risk the challenge, then to encourage innovation the authority cannot simply distribute money to any applicant. The challenge is necessary to overcome A's moral hazard problem. With probability β and a prize R, the incentive constraint is
Without challenge (β = 0), this constraint cannot be satisfied.
advantage of public funds should be exhausted. There is no point to mix it with the patent system and generate additional social loss. Alternatively, a "variable cost" component presents if there is another group of heterogeneous rent-seekers, each has different costs to fabricate the fake invention. The social cost of public fund then is increasing in the size of monetary reward: a higher reward attracts more rent-seekers.
This makes public bounty more attractive than a research prize, for to deter collusion it suffices to post a bounty of λθ * S < θ * (N − 1)π < K. Nevertheless, our result holds as long as the fixed cost is large enough.
